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Abstract: Dominick Graham, the first 
Professor of Military History at the 
University of New Brunswick, had a 
comparatively brief academic career. 
His historiographical arguments and 
ideas remain valuable today, however, 
almost a quarter of a century after his 
retirement. Graham’s most important 
study was his examination of the 
British Expeditionary Force contained 
in the book Fire-power. This paper 
will examine Graham’s intellectual 
legacy, demonstrating how Graham’s 
ideas can be applied to furthering our 
understanding of the role of science 
in the First World War. 
The Continuing Historical Legacy of 
Dominick “Toby” Graham
David Zimmerman
Dominick Graham, the first Professor of Military History 
at the University of New Brunswick 
(UNB), had a comparatively brief 
academic career. His historiographical 
arguments and ideas remain valuable 
today, however, almost a quarter of 
a century after his retirement. This 
paper will briefly examine Graham’s 
intellectual legacy, demonstrating 
how Graham’s ideas can be applied to 
furthering our understanding of the 
role of science in the First World War. 
Graham came to  academe 
relatively late; he had already enjoyed 
a successful and highly distinguished 
career in the Royal Artillery. During 
the Second World War, Graham 
served in the Middle East where 
he took part in the first siege of 
Tobruk, and was eventually captured 
by the Afrika Korps during the 
Eighth Army’s retreat into Egypt in 
August 1942. In 1943, after the Italian 
surrender, Graham escaped from a 
prisoner of war camp in Italy, made 
a daring journey down the spine 
of the peninsula, and rejoined the 
Allied forces after crossing German 
lines near Casino. When he had 
recovered from his Italian ordeal, 
he commanded an artillery battery 
in the Guards Armoured Division 
in Northwest Europe, 1944-45. He 
was twice wounded, mentioned in 
dispatches, and was awarded the 
Military Cross. After the war Graham 
commanded the Royal Artillery’s 
first nuclear armed battery and 
also taught at the Royal Military 
Academy at Sandhurst. Graham 
was an accomplished athlete; in 1954 
he was a member of Great Britain’s 
Olympic cross-country ski team. 
In 1959, after retiring from the 
army, Graham immigrated to Canada, 
taking up a position teaching math at 
Saint John High School in Saint John, 
New Brunswick. In 1961, Graham 
began his studies at UNB. He earned 
his BA in 1962 and a Master’s degree 
in 1963. One year later Graham 
became a lecturer in history. In 1969, 
he entered the PhD program at King’s 
College London, where he studied 
under Gerald Graham (no relation), 
the Canadian-born maritime and 
Imperial historian. After receiving his 
doctorate in 1970, Graham became an 
assistant professor at UNB.
Graham’s academic legacy 
may be seen in the institutional 
foundations he laid for the military 
history program at UNB, a program 
which today is firmly established 
in the Gregg Centre for the Study 
of War and Society. Graham also 
educated a generation of scholars 
in his rigorous and masterfully 
run graduate seminars. He had 
few doctoral students, since UNB’s 
graduate program was expanded 
to include a PhD just a few years 
before his retirement. Three of those 
doctoral students, if I dare say, have 
had rather successful careers. Marc 
Milner is Graham’s successor at 
UNB and the director of the Gregg 
Centre. I am professor of Military 
History at the University of Victoria. 
Scott Robertson is a member of the 
History Department at the University 
of Alberta. Graham also supervised 
a large number of MA students, 
many of whom went on to complete 
doctorates elsewhere. Some of his 
former MA students hold positions 
at the Royal Military College of 
Canada and King’s College London, 
among other institutions.  The 
students of his students hold far too 
numerous academic and government 
appointments to mention. 
While Graham’s important 
contribution as an institutional builder 
and educator are well known by 
those in the field of Canadian military 
history, the value of his scholarly 
contribution to the field is less well 
understood. Graham did not have 
time to produce an extensive body 
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of literature, and much of his work 
was traditional campaign narratives 
or biography.1 Yet Graham did write 
several important intellectual works, 
and it is this legacy and how it can be 
used to further our understanding the 
First World War that I wish to explore 
in this article.
Those who experienced Professor 
Graham’s graduate seminars know 
that there was no subject he was more 
passionate about than breaking the 
myths that dominated the writing on 
the First World War. I well remember 
being required to read much of Sir 
James Edmonds 14 volume official 
operational history of the British 
Army on the Western Front. Graham 
often began any seminar discussion 
of the Western Front by demanding: 
“What does Edmonds say?!” He 
did not believe Edmonds was 
infallible, far from it, but he insisted 
that students start from the basic 
fundamental body of knowledge 
found in the official history, and 
build from there. Graham was one 
of the first historians to challenge the 
established historical paradigm that 
the battles on the Western Front were 
all bloody and indecisive contests 
of attrition in which soldiers were 
senselessly slaughtered by generals 
who were uncaring buffoons. This 
dominant paradigm of the First 
World War was molded by books 
such as Alan Clark’s, The Donkeys, 
and the musical and film Clark’s 
work inspired, “Oh What a Lovely 
War.”2
In 1982, Dominick Graham and 
Shelford Bidwell’s book Fire-Power: 
British Army Weapons and Theories 
of War, 1904-1945 was published.3 
Graham wrote the chapters on the 
First World War. Unlike Clark, 
whose book only examined the 
failed offensives of 1915, Graham 
looked at the entire campaign on 
the Western Front right through to 
the end of the war. Graham’s theme 
was that the British Expeditionary 
Force (BEF) required time to educate 
itself about how to apply the new 
technology of war to the battlefield, 
particularly to restore effectiveness 
to the offensive. Graham showed 
the stark contrast between the early, 
failed breakthrough battles of Ypres 
and the Somme, with the masterly 
offensive of the Hundred Days in 
the summer and autumn of 1918, in 
which the BEF destroyed the fighting 
spirit of the German Army. Fire-Power 
was all about technology, not just 
the introduction of new technology, 
but principally, as it related to fully 
exploiting the potential of the most 
deadly weapon on the First World 
War battlefield – artillery, and its 
related weapon systems, including 
the machine gun. As Graham points 
out, almost all of the main weapons 
used to win in 1918 were available, 
albeit in small numbers, in 1914 
– from heavy howitzers to light 
machine guns. The obvious exception 
to this was the tank, but Graham did 
not consider the tank a war winning 
weapon, but rather an important 
auxiliary to the infantry.
Graham shows that by 1917, new 
technology and techniques allowed 
artillery to fire accurate, brief, and 
devastating bombardments which 
could neutralize German artillery, 
and the carefully coordinated curtain 
of steel of the creeping barrage 
which allowed the infantry to move 
forward. The use of artillery in the 
last two years of the war stood in 
stark contrast to the ineffective, 
poorly aimed, and days-long mass 
bombardments of earlier battles. 
These new technologies included 
aerial photographic mapping, which 
made possible the creation of highly 
accurate grid maps of the German 
rear areas, essential for accurate 
predicted fire. Radios made possible 
the correcting of shot by aerial or 
ground based observers. Graham 
also examined the importance of 
the introduction of better fuses with 
air bursts to destroy wire and kill 
defenders without churning up the 
ground. Other new types of shells, 
such as those filled with gas, were 
specifically designed to incapacitate 
German gunners. Counter battery fire 
could be directed by the development 
of gun sound ranging and flash 
spotting because these techniques 
provided a reasonably accurate way 
of detecting previously unobserved 
enemy gun positions.
While the artillery could make 
the initial assault possible, Graham 
realized that the infantry went 
through equally radical changes. 
After July 1916, German defensive 
tactics were transformed. Gone 
was the front line consisting of a 
continuous trench system; instead 
the German defences “were not 
linear but consisted of irregular and 
discontinuous positions unsuited 
to linear assaults.”4 Graham argued 
that progressive British officers 
realized that after assisting the 
infantry to capture their initial 
objectives, artillery was far less useful 
in maintaining positions from the 
inevitable German counterattacks. 
To hold their hard won gains and to 
expand their holdings, the infantry 
required their own fire-power. 
Graham went into great detail about 
the developments in the number 
and tactical deployment of infantry 
support weapons: heavy and light 
machine guns, mortars, grenades, and 
rifle grenades. The placement of these 
weapons in the army organization, 
w h e t h e r  u n d e r  t h e  c o n t r o l 
of brigade, battalion, company, 
platoon, or section, was crucial to 
understanding the transformation 
of infantry tactics from 1915 to 1918. 
(In general, weapons were pushed 
forward to make as much firepower 
as possible immediately available 
to the front line troops, with the 
most portable items (light machine 
guns, grenades and rifle grenades) 
ultimately being assigned to specially 
trained infantrymen in platoons and 
sections.)  
Graham argued that there were 
several factors which slowed the pace 
of improvements. In many ways the 
British Expeditionary Force, most 
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notably General Douglas Haig, 
commander-in-chief from 1915-1918, 
had to be dragged into the modern 
age which required a professional, 
technical-minded army. For instance, 
until the summer of 1918, Haig 
did not see the need for a central 
office in his command to gather and 
disseminate the lessons being learned 
on the battlefield.5 Individual army, 
corps, divisional, and even battalion 
commands were left to cope with 
and adapt to the reality of war in the 
industrial age.
Graham linked the development 
and application of technology and 
techniques to the social structure of the 
British and Commonwealth armies. 
Graham pointed out that much of the 
delay in correctly applying artillery 
to the battlefield was caused by the 
class system which generally kept 
artillery officers from implementing 
new doctrine. Within the artillery, 
a distinct hierarchy existed; officers 
of the garrison artillery, the group 
with the most experience with heavy 
artillery and “scientific” methods, 
were considered socially inferior 
to members of the field and horse 
artillery. Some elements of the BEF 
overcame these social constraints, or 
like the Canadians and Australian 
Corps, never were hamstrung by 
them. Progressive officers learned 
by experience or by observing the 
French, particularly at Verdun. Those 
units that incorporated the lessons of 
the earlier battles into their doctrine 
became the elite units in the BEF in 
1917 and 1918. 
Whatever the cause of earlier 
failures, Graham argued that by 
the summer of 1918 the BEF had 
successfully learned how to conduct 
modern offensive warfare. The 
brilliant but flawed plan for the 
Battle of Cambrai in November 
1917 was the archetype for future 
success. By building on the lessons 
of Cambrai, the BEF’s infantry, 
supported by tanks, artillery and 
ground attack aircraft, achieved a 
“technical knockout” against the 
German Army in the Hundred Days 
offensive in 1918. “For the British 
response to the challenges of 1918 
was a milestone in the history of land 
warfare of more significance than 
Haig indicated in his last dispatch, 
as it marked the first successful use 
of high performance teams in using 
high performance machines in the 
attack.”6 
For Graham, the Hundred Days 
was Haig’s great triumphant while 
the tragedy was that most of the 
lessons, so painfully learned by the 
BEF in war, were not incorporated 
into peacetime doctrine. The Army 
had “no historical sense” and, 
“in truth, the Army directors did 
not look further than the infantry 
to determine the meaning of the 
Hundred Days.”7 All other arms were 
auxiliaries, and the post-1919 Army 
actually reverted back to the tactics 
of the pre-First World War infantry. 
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Even worse, because of 
p o s t w a r  i n t e r - s e r v i c e 
rivalry, the techniques of 
close air support had to be 
completely relearned in the 
Second World War.
Fire-Power  was one 
of the early works which 
began the historiographical 
re-evaluation of the Western 
Front that has transformed 
our understanding of the 
conflict in the years since 
its publication. Since 1982, 
there has been an explosion 
o f  a c a d e m i c  s t u d i e s 
concerning British and 
Commonwealth armies in 
France.8 Not all of Graham’s 
arguments have withstood 
scholarly scrutiny, but Fire-
Power remains an essential 
read on the BEF.9
While  the BEF has 
been extensively studied, 
much of the rest of the First 
World War remains “an 
undiscovered country.” 
Graham addressed the 
failure of military historians 
to move beyond the battlefield in 
his article “Stress Lines and Gray 
Areas: The Utility of the Historical 
Method to the Military Profession.”10 
Graham explained that “within 
military history, certain aspects tend 
to be overlooked when the focus 
of attention is fixed on the last 400 
metres of the battlefield.”11 Graham 
argued that historians do their most 
important work examining the stress 
lines and gray areas that “occur at 
the junctions of the functional and 
dialectical planes of military planning 
and action and in the discontinuities 
between policy, military strategy, 
operations, and tactics.” Stress 
lines are particularly acute in the 
“overlapping boundaries” between 
different organizations. It is in these 
gray areas that Clausewitz found 
the sources of friction which often 
undermine even the most carefully 
planned strategy.12
The ideas and concepts contained 
in Fire-Power and “Stress-lines and 
Gray Areas” were used by Graham 
to direct his students’ historical 
research. His influence can be seen 
in Marc Milner’s ground breaking 
work on the Royal Canadian Navy 
and the Battle of the Atlantic.13 
Milner rewrote the history of the 
RCN by challenging orthodoxy 
that Canada’s naval war was a 
magnificent triumph. Instead, Milner 
wrote a narrative that wove together 
a new operational narrative, with a 
sophisticated study of Canadian and 
Allied naval, political, and industrial 
policy. Like Graham’s study of the 
British army, Milner focused on the 
Canadian navy’s struggle to learn the 
technological and tactical lessons of 
the increasingly complex campaign. 
While Graham’s argument 
focused on the conflict within military 
organizations, he understood that 
the stress lines and the 
friction that result from 
t h e m  a r e  e v e n  m o r e 
intense when military 
professionals must interact 
with other professional 
g r o u p s  a n d  t h e i r 
institutions. His guidance 
o f  m y  o w n  d o c t o r a l 
work on sc ience  and 
technology and the Royal 
Canadian Navy helped 
me to understand how 
institutional, linguistic, 
and cul tural  barr iers 
often make cooperation 
between disparate groups 
remarkably difficult, even 
when these groups share 
a  common goal . 14 My 
recent work continues to 
draw heavily on Graham’s 
i n t e l l e c t u a l  l e g a c y , 
particularly as I have 
adopted Graham’s view 
that major developments 
in the Second World War 
can only be understood if 
one traces their origins to 
the First World War. What 
follows is an examination of the use 
of science in the First World War to 
illustrate the continuing legacy of 
Graham’s historical ideas. 
The First World War eventually 
involved the  mobi l izat ion of 
entire societies, and because of the 
technological nature of the conflict, 
no group was more important than 
the technical experts – inventors, 
engineers, and scientists – who 
were instrumental in developing 
or improving weapons systems 
and techniques. Yet just as Graham 
discovered in  his  pioneer ing 
study of the British Army, many 
aspects of the war remain poorly 
understood, including military-
scientific interaction.15 Guy Hartcup, 
who wrote one general study of 
science and technology in the First 
World War reveals the extensive 
work undertaken by scientists, but he 
provides little analysis of the nature 
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the of scientific war effort.16 It seems 
certain, however, that science was 
not anywhere near as influential as 
it would be in the next world conflict 
Barton Hacker recently summarized 
the current historiography on 
technology and war since 1850. He 
concluded: 
From the standpoint of military 
technology, the 20th century divides 
between two eras. The first half of 
the century saw the culmination of 
the mechanization of armed forces 
that had begun midway through 
the previous century. During most 
of this period, European innovations 
dictated the pace and direction of 
change. World War II changed all 
that. Europeans became followers of 
military change driven by the arms 
race between the USA and the Soviet 
Union. Two innovations, both largely 
products of World War II, dominated 
the second half of the century but 
proceeded with surprisingly little 
interaction. One was the elaboration 
of nuclear arsenals and their delivery 
systems. The other was the radical 
reconstruction of conventional 
warfare through applied electronics, 
especially from the 1960s onward.17
Like most historians who have 
discussed the ways in which new 
technologies have been developed, 
Hacker argues that until the Second 
World War, innovation was primarily 
driven by empirical research. During 
the Second World War, military 
technology proliferated, while 
applied science became ever less 
distinct from scientific engineering. 
Hacker’s broad outlines appear 
sound, but his argument tends to 
obscure the actual origins of the 
major shift in military innovation to 
applied science. On this point, Hacker 
offers us little guidance because 
the First World War remains the 
unknown country. After listing some 
of the important technological and 
tactical developments, Hacker states 
that in the First World War: 
Technology and science took their 
places among the activities the state 
sought to control, with varying 
success. None of these achievements 
came cheaply. The war clearly eroded 
Europe’s world hegemony, sapping 
the vitality of Europe’s overseas 
empires and diverting international 
trade into new and less favorable 
channels. Scholars still struggle to 
assess the full range of the war’s 
social and psychological costs, at 
home as well as abroad.18
Hacker offers no real claims to how 
science was mobilized by the state, or 
whether or not this mobilization had 
any effect on the outcome of the war. 
In this I do not criticize his work, for 
in such a sweeping summary, one 
should not expect that he would do 
anything more than report on the 
existing historiography.
Graham’s thesis that the First 
World War was a great educational 
experience for the army can be 
applied more broadly. The war 
was not just about learning how 
to harness the weapons produced 
by empirical invention of the late 
19th and early 20th centuries, but 
also about understanding how to 
harness all the new tools provided 
by the related scientific innovations 
that occurred in this same period. 
Scientists have written that it was 
during the First World War that the 
break between 19th century empirical 
innovation and the application of 
applied science to war began.19 
The difference between empirical 
innovation and applied science 
is extremely difficult to define in 
absolute terms, and any definition 
can only be given in terms that those 
who participated in the scientific 
war effort would have understood.20 
Leading scientists,  l ike Ernest 
Rutherford, viewed empiricists 
as researchers who emphasized 
tediously exact experimentation over 
experimental work guided by theory. 
This “old-fashioned” approach was 
eclipsed by applied science, in which 
the research was guided by the latest 
theoretical knowledge.21
While the first attempts to bring 
applied science into solving the 
perplexing problems faced by armies 
and navies occurred between 1914 
and 1918, there were no scientific-
technical breakthroughs similar to 
the cavity magnetron or the atomic 
bomb in the Second World War. 
Even where new approaches in 
applied science were used, such 
as in the development of chemical 
weapons, the lack of cooperation 
between scientists and the military 
limited their effectiveness. When 
first deployed in 1915, poison gas 
failed to achieve the hoped for 
breakthrough of the allied lines 
because insufficient planning went 
into a way to deliver it on target. As 
Graham outlined, only much later 
in the war, with the introduction of 
the new techniques for accurately 
aiming gas-filled shells, did chemical 
weapons achieve a crucial role in 
bringing decisiveness back to the 
battlefield. There are certainly areas 
where applied science was influential 
in determining the course of the war. 
The most important application of 
science to military problems is in 
chemistry, not chemical weaponry, 
but in the developments which 
satisfied the huge increases in 
demand for explosives.22 Another 
example of a scientific breakthrough 
was the almost accidental discovery 
by German scientists of the science 
of aeronautics and the subsequent 
development  of  the  super ior 
aerodynamic qualities of aircraft 
like the thick wing Fokker D VII, a 
weapon that entered service just a 
little too late in too small numbers 
to swing the air battle in favor of the 
Germans.23
In order to understand the 
reasons for the limited success of 
science in the First World War, it 
is necessary to look at Graham’s 
“stress lines” both within science and 
in its relationship with the armed 
forces. Like the military, academic 
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science, particularly in physics 
and chemistry, was undergoing 
revolutionary changes in the early 
part of the twentieth century. 
Distinctions between physicists, 
chemists, and engineering were not 
as clear as they are today. Scientists’ 
understanding of basic universal 
laws of physics, for instance, was in a 
state of extraordinary flux. Einstein’s 
theories, after all, had not yet been 
accepted or proved. Newtonian 
mechanics remained the dominant 
way to understand the universe, 
with the first experimental evidence 
supporting Einstein’s theories being 
made only during the conflict. 
Methods for applying scientific 
theory to practical problems were 
not broadly accepted either in the 
academy or industry.24
Graham’s external “stress lines” 
between science and the military 
were even more crucial. In a situation 
strikingly similar to what Graham 
analyzed in the BEF, social barriers 
delayed and then hampered the 
mobilization of scientists. Initially, 
scientists were specifically excluded 
from involvement in military research 
by military technical experts, who 
considered scientists as impractical 
theoreticians. At the start of the war, 
scientists enlisted in the armed forces 
and, with the military seeing no need 
for their special skills, they served, and 
a number died, in front-line combat 
units. The death of experimental 
physicist Henry Moseley during the 
Dardanelles campaign in August 
1915, prompted an outcry by British 
scientists. Rutherford bemoaned that 
Moseley’s “services would have been 
far more useful to his country in one 
of the numerous fields of scientific 
inquiry rendered necessary by the 
war than by the exposure to the 
chances of a Turkish bullet.”25 
The difficult learning process 
which Graham described occurring 
in the BEF as it struggled with 
modern warfare, was even more 
tortuous in the scientific war. It 
was not until late 1915 that Allied 
forces began to utilize scientists to 
solve military technical problems 
and weapon systems development. 
Even then, scientists were often 
excluded from collaborative work 
with “more practical” inventors 
and engineers. One of the salient 
features of military research during 
the conflict was the time it took time 
for scientists to win the confidence 
of military and political leaders that 
their skills were applicable to solving 
practical war-related problems. On 16 
July 1917, Horace Darwin and A.V. 
Hill, leading Cambridge University 
scientists, heavily involved in British 
military research, wrote to prominent 
American scientists including George 
Ellery Hale, director of the Wilson 
Observatory and head of the new 
National Research Council. The 
Cambridge scientists wished to 
warn their colleagues not to repeat 
their own country’s “mistake of 
allowing men with engineering and 
scientific knowledge to be employed 
in capacities (military or civil) where 
their particular abilities were useless. 
The military authorities, as well as 
the public,” they lamented, “did 
not (and to some extent do not still) 
realize the extreme value of a training 
in science and engineering to men 
called upon to build up, in many 
cases out of nothing, some means 
of dealing quickly and effectively 
with a difficulty, a menace, or an 
opportunity, that had suddenly 
presented itself.”26
The skills of scientists would only 
be recognized by the military when 
specific technical problems proved 
unsolvable by military technical 
experts. The military had little interest 
in long-term fundamental research; 
generals and admirals believed that to 
win the war they required immediate 
practical answers which were directly 
applicable to the battlefield. Within 
these limits, scientists did make 
useful contributions to the war effort, 
but primarily by pursuing empirical 
innovation, and not by applied 
science. 
The full shortcomings of the use 
of science in the First World War can 
be most clearly seen in the largest 
of all military research programs 
of the conflict, which was directed 
at developing techniques to detect 
and destroy U-boats. In the First 
World War, anti-submarine research 
was hampered by the absence of a 
close working relationship between 
scientists, engineers, and naval 
technical experts. In both the United 
States and Great Britain, scientists 
had to fight a protracted bureaucratic 
struggle to win recognition that 
their skills could aid the war effort. 
Although scientists had made some 
important contributions, naval 
technical experts and engineers 
remained unwilling to work with 
university-based scientists. In both 
countries, it was necessary to create 
separate research laboratories for the 
two groups.27 
In early 1915 in Great Britain, 
Commander (later, acting Captain) 
C.P. Ryan was placed in charge of the 
Hawkcraig Admiralty Experimental 
Station. Ryan was an innovator in 
early naval wireless technology; he 
had left the navy in 1911 to pursue his 
career as an inventor with the Marconi 
Company. Ryan had rejoined the 
service at the start of hostilities and 
had begun experimenting with the 
use of hydrophones. Only when 
the submarine threat was well 
established was Ryan’s work given 
official sanction, and the Hawkcraig 
Station established. While Ryan’s 
team made important strides forward 
in the development of practical 
directional hydrophones, efforts to 
supplement his team with academic 
scientists floundered. In September 
1915, when the first scientists and 
engineers arrived at Hawkcraig, 
Ryan viewed them as imposed 
outsiders, and was unwilling to 
cooperate with them. Only at the end 
of 1916, after months of competitive 
rather than complementary research, 
was it decided to move the scientists 
to a separate facility. In 1917 a 
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laboratory was opened for them 
at Parkeston Quay at Harwich.28 
Communication between the two 
laboratories remained “not very 
intimate” for the rest of the war.29
In the United States, it also took 
some time before the merits of the 
scientific approach were appreciated. 
In June 1916, the National Academy 
of Science formed the National 
Research Council to manage war 
research.  The NRC was not a 
government agency, nor did have 
direct access to government funding; 
initially, much of its money came 
from private donations. A competing 
organization, the Naval Consulting 
Board ,  had  been  es tab l i shed 
somewhat earlier by the United 
States Navy under the leadership 
of Thomas Edison. This board 
deliberately limited the influence of 
academic scientists, viewing them 
as impractical theoreticians. By 
spring 1917, the consulting board 
established a research station at 
Nahant, Massachusetts, in an effort to 
convert a device originally designed 
to send Morse code through water into 
a submarine detector. As a reflection 
of  the board’s  discrimination 
against university-based scientists, 
the Nahant group deliberately 
excluded them,  ostensibly  to 
avoid complications regarding the 
ownership of any patents which 
might develop from their research. 
Instead, the staff at Nahant was 
made up of industrial engineers and 
inventors. Academic scientists were 
given their own research facility at 
New London, Connecticut.30
The  compet i t ion  be tween 
inventors and academic scientists 
never fully disappeared. This led to 
much duplication and administrative 
confusion. In Great Britain and the 
United States, privately financed 
anti-submarine research ventures 
added to  the  confusion.  The 
Manchester, or Lancashire, Anti-
Submarine Committee was formed 
in 1917 by local “manufacturers, 
business men (sic), and engineers, 
with some professors from the 
university.”31 In the United States, 
Vannevar Bush developed a device 
in which the presence of a submerged 
submarine created an imbalance in 
an electromagnetic field suspended 
under the hull of a submarine chaser. 
His work was privately financed 
by AMRAD corporation, owned by 
Ph
ot
o 
by
 A
lla
in
 S
al
la
rd
. U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f N
ew
 B
ru
ns
w
ic
k 
Ar
ch
iv
es
, F
ile
 4
03
, 8
8-
10
-1
3a
.
Professor Graham relaxes in his office at the University of New Brunswick. On the wall behind him is a poster from the 1956 Winter 
Olympics in Cortina d’Ampezzo, Italy where he competed in cross country skiing for Great Britain. The bottoms of his skis can be 
seen at the top middle of the photo. 
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J.P. Morgan. Bush later recalled one 
of the consequences of the lack of a 
coordinated research program:
Toward the end of the first war there 
were several other groups, about 
whom I knew nothing, working on 
the same problem. One group was 
trying by trailing a wire which had 
some nonpolarizing electrodes on 
it, to pick up stray currents from 
the submarine resulting from the 
electrolytic effects produced, for 
instance, between a bronze propeller 
and a steel hull. I did not even know 
they were working on it until one day 
down at New London I went aboard 
a craft and saw the gear. I asked 
them what they were doing and they 
told me. I asked what trouble they 
were having and they said, “The 
stabilizing of the galvanometer on 
shipboard sufficiently so that we can 
get proper sensitivity. “ I said, “Why 
don’t you use a pivot instrument? 
Weston Instruments has just gotten 
out a very sensitive microampere 
meter of this form.” They had never 
heard of it. They got one and put it 
on deck, and it promptly proceeded 
to work all right.32
In reality, the duplication of effort 
did not matter, since neither group 
had any theoretical scientific basis 
to develop a submarine detection 
device. There was no attempt to 
conduct wide-ranging systematic 
investigations into ocean acoustics.33
This  lack  of  fundamenta l 
knowledge meant that First World 
War anti-submarine warfare research 
was far more convoluted than 
the scientific wartime emergency 
program that would develop just two 
decades later. For instance, at the New 
London laboratory, “at first the work 
naturally took the form of testing out 
abstract ideas evolved from the whole 
range of possibilities presented by 
the fields of sound, light, heat and 
electricity.”34 The number of projects 
undertaken expanded exponentially. 
It was difficult to reduce the number 
of devices being developed since 
leading researchers often defended 
their approach vigorously. Most of 
these research projects had some basis 
in fundamental scientific knowledge, 
but with little or no understanding 
of how such devices might work in 
the ocean environment. It was not 
even possible to concentrate efforts 
in acoustics since several other types 
of detection apparatus appeared to 
have equal promise. 
Empirical innovation could not 
solve the mysteries of detecting the 
unseen, submerged U-boat. A huge 
array of technologies for submarine 
detection was experimented with 
during the conflict, but the majority of 
the research was in passive listening, 
or hydrophone technology. The best 
indicator of the overall performance 
of these devices is their comparative 
lack of operational success. Almost 
10,000 hydrophones were delivered 
to the Royal Navy during the war, but 
only three or four German submarines 
were sunk in actions where ship-
borne hydrophone detection played 
a key role. One, or possibly two, other 
U-boats were sunk by mines after 
being detected by fixed-mounted 
harbour defence hydrophones. This 
compares poorly to the number of 
U-boats sunk by another new military 
technology, aeroplanes, which sent at 
least nine submarines to the bottom.35
One anti-submarine research 
team, led by the French astrophysicist 
Professor Paul Langevin, did work 
in a fashion that was much more 
similar to Second World War research 
projects. Langevin was an early 
supporter of the theory of relativity 
and an expert on paramagnetism, 
diamagnetism, secondary x-rays, and 
the behaviour of ions. Langevin’s 
research methodology stood in stark 
contrast to other anti-submarine 
investigation. Rather than employing 
empirical experimentation that 
dominated most First World War 
anti-submarine research, a British 
scientist later commented, “Professor 
Langevin did it the other way, a 
The campaign to defeat German 
submarines in the First World War is 
a good example of how friction made 
the application of science to war less 
successful than it might have been. Here 
the German submarine SM UC-97 is tied 
up in Toronto during a Victory Bond tour 
in 1919.
Library and Archives Canada PA 30314; courtesy of RCN History & Heritage
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more creditable way; he envisioned 
it, looked for it, calculated for it and 
built his apparatus to perform it.”36 
Specifically, Langevin realized that 
the best hope to detect submerged 
U-boats was in developing a means 
to deflect a pulse of high frequency 
sound off its hull. Langevin took 
his knowledge of the piezo-electric 
properties of quartz to generate 
a suitable sound, and, in turn, to 
transform that reflected sound into 
an electrical signal that could be 
amplified sufficiently for an operator 
to hear. By the end of the war, 
Langevin had invented active sonar. 
Sonar, however, was not ready for 
operational use before the Armistice. 
The defeat of the U-boat was mainly 
achieved by the introduction of 
convoys, and scientists had only a 
marginal influence on the outcome 
of the campaign. 
While Langevin’s active sonar 
was a key instrument in effective anti-
submarine warfare during the Second 
World War, his applied scientific 
methodology had little influence 
on shaping the nature of military-
scientific research that occurred 
in the later conflict. Soon after the 
armistice of November 1918, a cloak 
of secrecy was thrown over sonar 
research, and work was confined to 
government establishments, which 
on the whole reverted to old style 
empirical research. Without external 
scientific guidance, navies pursued 
their own empirical research into 
improving sonar technology, with 
little regard to fundamental research 
into ocean acoustics.37
The primary influence of the First 
World War on shaping the military-
scientific revolution of the Second 
World War was, I would argue, in 
two major developments. First, for 
most junior or middle-level scientists, 
who were the front-line scientific 
workers in the First World War, their 
experiences were mainly unhappy 
ones. Poor organization, bureaucratic 
obstacles, and outright hostility to 
these scientists’ efforts to apply their 
knowledge to war, left them with a 
determination that things must be 
different if they were called again 
into the service of their nation. By 
the 1930s, these junior scientists, like 
Vannevar Bush and Henry Tizard, 
were the scientific leaders. 
S e c o n d ,  c e r t a i n  r e s e a r c h 
programs continued to promote 
cooperation between academic and 
government scientists, the military, 
and industry, particularly in the field 
of aviation. Aviation was viewed as a 
strategic industry of the future, and 
money was provided to undertake 
fundamental research and to allow 
industry to use the results of this 
research in the latest model of aircraft. 
The extraordinary transformation 
of aviation in the interwar period 
was the result. It is no coincidence 
that both Bush and Tizard acted as 
chairs of their country`s aviation 
research boards, and then became 
heads of major military-scientific 
organizations. The highly successful 
development in Great Britain of the 
radar-based air defence system in the 
late 1930s, shows how much military-
scientific cooperation had changed 
since 1918. The development of radar, 
and its incorporation into the Royal 
Air Force’s Fighter Command, was a 
model for Second World War applied 
scientific research projects in Great 
Britain and the United States.38 
It was through their efforts that 
science became better applied to 
war. In the summer of 1940, a group 
of senior American scientists led 
by Bush successfully lobbied the 
Roosevelt administration to establish 
the National Defense Research 
Committee, which would supervise 
the mobilization of civilian scientists. 
Bush explained the scientists’ 
motivation for forming the NDRC:
We were all drawn together early in 
1940 by one thing we deeply shared 
– worry. It was during the period of 
the “phony” war. We were agreed 
that the war was bound to break 
out into an intense struggle, that 
America was sure to get into it in 
one way or another, sooner or later, 
that it would be a highly technical 
struggle, that we were by no means 
prepared in this regard, and finally 
and most importantly, that the 
military system as it existed, and as it 
had operated during the first world 
war [sic], which we all remembered, 
would never fully produce the new 
instrumentalities which we would 
certainly had need, and which were 
possible because of the state of 
science as it then stood.39 
Graham presented the BEF of 
1914-18 as learning how to fight 
modern war and ultimately achieving 
the great triumph of the Hundred 
Days. Graham argued that from 
this success came the failure of the 
interwar period. Graham would 
not have been surprised to discover 
that scientists learned better from 
failure than the British Army learned 
from success. He might point out 
the obvious parallel of the Weimar 
Republic’s army, which laid the 
ground for the Wehrmacht’s early 
successes in the Second World War 
by their careful study of the causes 
for German defeat in 1918. 
Graham’s view that the First 
World War was an educational 
experience for the British Army, once 
it had been confronted by failure, 
is more broadly applicable to the 
entire conflict. Scientific-military 
cooperation evolved during the war, 
but there was insufficient time for 
the lessons to be applied effectively 
to the battlefield. Graham’s focus 
on the stress lines in military 
organizations remains an invaluable 
approach to the study of institutions 
in war. The gray areas, within science 
itself and between science and the 
military, produced the stress lines 
or friction that made the application 
of science to war less successful than 
it might have been. Graham may 
no longer promulgate and develop 
his insights by leading stimulating 
and challenging seminars, but his 
9
: The Continuing Historical Legacy of Dominick “Toby” Graham
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015
80
historical methods and arguments 
continue to have a profound influence 
among military historians. 
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